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THE STATUS OF THE RULE REQUIRING PRIVITY IN
BREACH OF WARRANTY ACTIONS IN CALIFORNIA
By T. C. BLACK*
The liability of a seller of personal property to persons other than his
immediate buyer is a problem which has long troubled courts, lawyers, legal
writers and law students alike. The most common remedies of the buyer
are by statutory, negligence, or warranty actions. It is with this latter that
this article is concerned. The oft-stated rule is that to maintain such an
action for warranty, the parties must be in a relation of contractual privity.'
The status of this rule in California has recently been characterized as "in
a state of flux."' To determine the aptness of this description is the prob-
lem at hand.
Introduction
The necessary privity is of course present where the person who bought
the goods brings suit against the person who sold him the goods. But when
someone not the seller is made the defendant, or when someone not the
buyer is the plaintiff, then privity in its usual sense is absent. This problem
may arise in any of a number of ways. Usually it occurs: (1) where the
retail buyer transfers the goods to a third person or where the goods were
purchased by the retail buyer to be used or consumed by a third person;
or (2) where the buyer seeks to hold the manufacturer of goods responsible
though he has actually purchased them through a retailer or one or more
intermediary distributors.
As an example of the first situation, consider the purchase of goods by
the wife which were intended to be used by the husband. Assuming that
the husband were somehow injured by a defect in the goods, there would be
no privity in the usual case between him and the retailer and he would have
no remedy in an action for the warranty. Of course, if the wife herself had
been injured, then she could have maintained the suit, but only for her own
damages. The second situation would normally arise where the manufac-
turer appears to be the only financially responsible party. Under modern
marketing methods, it is probably the general rule that one or more whole-
salers, retailers, or distributors may function between the manufacturer
and the ultimate consumer of the goods. In theory, each vendor would be
in privity only with his own vendee.3 As a practical matter, the retailer
might often not be sufficiently solvent to afford the consumer his relief.
Likewise, any financial irresponsibility along this chain would relieve the
parties above from the burden imposed by the warranty.
* Member, Third-Year Class.
1 WIISTON, SALES, § 244 (rev. ed. 1948).
2 young v. Aeroil Products Co., 248 F.2d 185, 190 (9th Cir., 1957).
3For the reductio ad absurdum of this proposition, see: Kasler & Cohen v. Slavonski,
[19281 1 K.B. 78, 96 L.J.K.B. 850, where there was a series of five warranty actions before the
manufacturer was ultimately held liable.
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The injustices which have arisen from the somewhat artificial require-
ment of privity have led courts and attorneys alike to devise ways to avoid
the consequences of strictly logical adherence to the general rule. In some
cases, an agency may be found so as to constitute the buyer the legal rep-
resentative of the consumer.4 In the common situation of a purchase for the
benefit of other members of the family, the lack of actual authority is the
greatest hindrance to implement this theory. Some courts have contem-
plated the idea of warranties running with the goods by analogy to the law
of real property, despite the lack of common law authority for this proposi-
tion. Others have found an implied assignment by the buyer to the con-
sumer of the action for the breach of warranty on goods transferred by the
buyer.' Again, the usual facts of the purchase for the family benefit would
not adequately support this theory in reason. In some rare cases, an offer
for a unilateral contract might be found embodied in the advertising of the
manufacturer made generally to the public and to be accepted by the
purchase or use of a certain product.7 The resulting contract would provide
the necessary relation of privity of the parties. One of the more tenable
theories advanced is that of a third party beneficiary contract.8 Under this
view, any sale might be made with the intent to benefit the ultimate con-
sumer of the goods. Here, the payment by a person other than the one in-
jured would not necessarily be a bar to privity. The difficulty is in finding
the intent to benefit sufficiently made out from the facts of an ordinary
sale. This might be especially difficult where the seller knows nothing of
the buyer or what the buyer intends doing with the goods.
With the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act by California in 1931,0 the
rule was by no means clarified. The Act does not expressly make the re-
quirement that parties be in a relation of contractual privity in order to
maintain an action on a warranty. Instead, the rights and liabilities of the
parties in matters of warranties are stated in terms of "the buyer" and
"the seller."'" But nowhere are found the terms of consumer, manufac-
turer, user, or such other- nomenclature as would expressly indicate that
privity would not be required. However, "buyer" is further defined as the
"person who buys, or agrees to buy, or any legal successor in interest of
such person." (Emphasis added.)-" The phrase "successor in interest" is
likewise employed in defining the word "seller." So far, "legal successor" has
not been held to include all consumers. An argument might be made that
a consumer who received the goods from the actual buyer thereby succeeds
to the buyer's interest in the goods. By force of the Sales Act, then, such a
consumer could also succeed to all rights of action for the warranty such as
4 Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
5 Patargias v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 322 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E. 2d 162 (1947) ; Contra:
Pezel v. Yerek, 56 Cal. App. 304, 205 Pac. 475 (1922).
6 Tennebaum v. Pendergast, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 231, 90 N.E. 2d 453 (1948).
7 Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 1 Q.B. 256 (1893).
8 Singer v. Zabelin, 24 N.Y.S. 2d 962 (1941).
9CAL. Civ. CoDE §§ 1721-1800.
10 CA.. Civ. CODE § 1735.
21 CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1796(1).
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the original buyer possessed. The courts have not construed the meaning
to go beyond the traditional ideas of privity. As will be seen later, where
an exception is made to the rule, the California courts have merely extended
the meaning of the word "buyer" to include those not necessarily in privity
with the seller.
The California Approach to Privity
The early California cases followed the strict rule that required priv-
ity,' although several cases indicated that the court might favorably view
an action by a person other than the buyer under the proper circumstan-
ces. 13 In Jensen v. Berris," the plaintiff was a member of a club which held
dinners at regular intervals, distributing the costs by rotating the duty to
pay among the members. At one of these dinners, for which the plaintiff
had not paid, she became sick due to food poisoning found to be a result
of the dinner served. In allowing the plaintiff to recover for breach of war-
ranty, the court said that the fact that the plaintiff did not personally of-
fer the purchase price would not allow the defendant restaurant to deny
the privity.
The first major exception to the rule was made in the leading case of
Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co.'5 Here, the plaintiff's husband had pur-
chased a sandwich which was manufactured by the defendant Duchess
Sandwich Co., and sold by another defendant, one Kilpatrick, the owner
of the restaurant where the food had been purchased. The wife ate a por-
tion of the sandwich which was infested with maggots and as a result be-
came sick. She brought the action on a breach of the implied warranty of
fitness for the mental and physical injury suffered. It was held that lack
of privity would not bar recovery from the manufacturer. This, in effect,
allowed one not the ultimate buyer to recover from one not the retail sel-
ler. The court noted the conflict of authorities concerning the question of
privity as applied to the sale of food and drugs. In the light of various
statutes which are aimed at safeguarding public health, the pure food and
drug acts,1" and other contemporary legislation, the court said in refer-
ence to Section 1735 of the Civil Code of California:' 7
In adopting the statute here concerned as a part of the Uniform Sales Act,
it was the clear intent of the legislature that, with respect to foodstuffs, the
1 2 Binion v. Sasaki, 5 Cal. App. 2d 15, 41 P.2d 585 (1935); Cliff v. Calif. Spray Chemi-
cal Co., 83 Cal. App. 424, 257 Pac. 99 (1927).
's Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal.2d 33, 77 P.2d 833 (1938) ; Jensen v. Berris,
31 Cal. App. 2d 537, 88 P.2d 220 (1939).
1431 Cal App. 2d 537, 88 P.2d 220 (1939).
15 14 CaI.2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939) ; Accord: Vacarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d
687, 163 P.2d 470 (1945); Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 470
(1945).
16 CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE, §§ 26450-26461 (Pure Food Act), §§ 26200-26208 (Pure Drug
Act).
17 14 Cal.2d at 283, 93 P.2d at 804.
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implied warranty provision therein contained should inure to the benefit of
any ultimate purchaser or consumer of food; and that it was not intended
that a strict "privity of contract" would be essential for the bringing of
an action by such ultimate consumer for asserted breach of the implied
warranty.
The court also answered another objection of the defendant manufacturer
that the plaintiff was not the "buyer" within the terms of the Sales Act. The
injustice of such a construction of the statute was emphasized by the court.
They illustrated it by the example of the parent purchasing food for his in-
fant child. The applicability of various theories, especially that of a third
party beneficiary contract was discussed. In the final analysis, however,
the court did not attempt to fit the decision into one of the precise, albeit
artificial, categories. Instead, it merely held that privity is not required in
this particular type of action. The consumer is entitled to the judicial pro-
tection through the broad policies behind the apparent legislative intent to
protect the consuming public in sales of food and medicine. 18
Another apparent exception to the general rule was made in the case of
Free v. Sluss.'9 There, the Appellate Department of the Superior Court in
Los Angeles County held that a manufacturer might not employ the de-
fense of lack of privity where there was a printed guarantee of quality on
the goods themselves. The defendant was a manufacturer of soap. A re-
tail grocer had purchased a number of cases of the defendant's soap from
a wholesaler and had found that the soap was unmerchantable. The label
was found to make an express warranty of quality and it was held that the
manufacturer could not deny the warranty where it was addressed to those
who would deal in the product. With the increasing use of advertising on
labels and containers of goods sold to the general public, the effect of this
exception may become more important.
A similar situation in which an exception was likewise made is where
the express warranty is made directly to the purchaser or consumer by the
manufacturer. In the case of Southern California Enterprises v. Walter &
Co., the plaintiff arranged to buy a carpet which was to be made by the
defendant manufacturers. By agreement with the defendant, the carpet
was then purchased through an intermediary who made the actual sale to
the plaintiff. In reference to the rule requiring privity and the pertinent
sections of the Civil Code, the court said:2
There is no implication in these sections that an express warranty by a man-
ufacturer of merchandise to a user on condition that he purchase the goods
from an intermediary is not valid.
1 8 The rule of the Klein case is limited on its facts to foodstuffs. But as the rationale was
the policy implicit in the Pure Drug Act as well as the Pure Food Act, it would seem logical
that the rule might include drugs and medicines. The point is undecided so far in California.
19 87 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 933, 197 P.2d 854 (1948).
20 78 Cal. App. 2d 750, 178 P.2d 785 (1947).
2Id. at 760, 178 P.2d at 790.
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The general rule, then, was held not to be applicable to this type of situation.
To summarize briefly, these cases present two major exceptions to the rule
which have thus far been judicially recognized in California: (1) where
the implied warranty is of foodstuffs; and (2) where there is an express
warranty by the manufacturer, either on the label or package or made
personally to the consumer.
Container Warranty
A further question which arises in the sale of foods is that of the con-
tainer. The problem is further complicated when there is no actual sale
of the container itself, but instead it is bailed with the expectation that it
will be returned. On principle, it would seem that in either case the plain-
tiff should recover, regardless of a lack of privity. There seems little rea-
son or logic in limiting the warranty on the container of food further than
its contents. If there is a public policy which favors the warranty of the
food and which can be derived from a legislative intent, the same would
hold true of the container. The Agricultural Code expressly provides a
certain duty of care as to containers of milk.2 It has been suggested, with
reason it is believed, that the same policy governing the warranty of food
would therefore extend to the container as well. The question of whether
or not there was a bailment of the container should likewise not deprive
the consumer of a remedy. Section 1735 of the Civil Code asserts that
the warranty is on all "goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale"
(emphasis added), and does not limit itself expressly to those goods
which were actually the subject of the sale. The container passes as a
necessary item in the sale, thus it should be included in the warranty to
effectuate the logical intent of the statute. The question has not yet been
squarely determined in California, although there is dicta to the effect that
the warranty might not extend to the container without the necessary priv-
ity.23 However, as a matter of fact, most of the cases involving containers
have successfully turned for the plaintiff on some other grounds than war-
ranty, usually negligence.'
Arguments Against the Privity Requirement
It should be mentioned here that the tort liability of the manufacturer
for negligence does not depend any longer on privity of contract in most
courts. The early common law rule of Winterbottom v. Wright' originally
held that privity was essential. As the exceptions to this rule became more
numerous, especially in the cases where the article manufactured was an
22 CAL. Acaic. CODE § 701.
23 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) ; Gerber v. Faber,
54 Cal. App. 2d 674, 129 P.2d 485 (1942).
2 See Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952) ; Gordon v.
Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal.2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949) ; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) ; Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614, 140 P.2d 369 (1943).
25 10 M.&W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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inherently "dangerous instrumentality," the rule became all but swallowed
up in its exceptions. This metamorphosis of the law was recoginzed in the
leading case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company" wherein a rule wvas
stated to the effect that the manufacturer of goods offered for sale is lia-
ble to all persons who might be expected to be injured by any defects due
to the negligent manufacture of the goods. This rule has been recognized as
the law in almost all jurisdictions, including California. 7 For the injured
party, however, there still remains the practical difficulty of proving the
negligence of the manufacturer.
The courts have aided the plaintiff in this respect through the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. By the force of this doctrine, an inference or a pre-
sumption of negligence is raised where: (1) the injury is caused by an
agency or instrumentality under the exclusive control of the defendant; (2)
the accident is of a type which ordinarily does not happen unless someone
is negligent; and (3) the injury is not due to any voluntary act or con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff. As a general rule, all three conditions
must be present. 8 Where the doctrine is successfully invoked, the inference
of negligence is sufficient evidence to get the case before the jury.29
Although the injured consumer's possible remedy for negligence is not
primarily within the scope of this comment, it should be mentioned that
the action for negligence represents a poor substitute for an action on war-
ranty from the standpoint of the plaintiff. If the consumer is unable to bene-
fit from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it would often be practically im-
possible for him to show negligence on the part of the manufacturer. This
is due to the fact that the circumstances and methods of manufacture are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the manufacturer. Likewise, the place
of manufacture in our modern economy may be thousands of miles away
from the place where the injury occurs. And on the other hand, where the
doctrine is involved, it might be no less inconvenient for the manufacturer to
rebut the inference. This is especially true in those situations where the
requirement of control by the manufacturer has been relaxed by the courts
as in the case of containers of foodstuffs." These extensions of the applica-
tion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur have approached the point of ap-
plying strict liability without ever quite reaching it in name. This represents
a situation where the manufacturer is strictly liable for defects in the con-
tents of a food container, but the container itself is governed by a different
2217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2 7 Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., 1 Cal.2d 229,34 P. 2d 481 (1934). See PROSSER, ToRTS
500 (2d ed. 1955).
28 PROSSER, TORTS 199-217 (2d ed. 1955).
2 Prosser, Res. Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CAiav. L. REv. 183 (1949) ; See also for
a discussion of Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954) where there
is dicta to the effect that the defendant must rebut the inference raised by res ipsa loquitur or
face the threat of a directed verdict; Note, 43 CmA F. L REv. 146 (1955).
so Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal.2d 514, 203 P.2d 522 (1949).
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rule. As was recently stated by Justice Traynor in a concurring and dis-
senting opinion where a defect in a milk bottle was involved :31
It would clarify the law to repudiate that differentiation openly rather than
to circumvent it covertly and haphazardly by leaving juries free to impose
strict liability if they so choose under the guise of res ipsa loquitur.
As an original question, it would seem that a lack of privity would have
little effect on an injured party's ability to recover for breach of warranty.
In the beginning, it was an action sounding in tort and brought by a writ of
trespass on the case.2 As a tort, it was similar to an action for deceit except
that the scienter of the tortfeasor was not required. This view continued
for more than a hundred years. Then, in the year 1778, the writ of assump-
sit was employed in an action for breach of warranty and accepted by the
court.3 3 The advantages of the use of this writ, especially the ability to
plead the common counts, probably accounted for much of its popularity.
For, since that time, this writ was used more or less exclusively. The uni-
versal use of assumpsit, in turn, emphasized a contractual nature of the
action and eventually led to the belief that it was the only remedy avail-
able. Being based on contract, the requirement of privity was assumed. The
general rule, then, is founded on a historical confusion between the ideas
of writ and right. The emphasis on the contractual remedy led the courts
to lose sight of the original essence of the action-namely a duty which
the law imposed on one who assumed to sell goods to the public. With the
sole exception of the privity requirement, the action on the warranty is even
today closer to tort than to contract. It is governed by the one year statute
of limitations for tort actions. Also, it abates at the death of either the in-
jured party or of the person making the implied warranty and survives
under the wrongful death statutes. The measure of damages is that of tort.
Finally, it is a duty imposed by law rather than by the mutual consent of
the parties.
Most of the legal writers who have considered the rule requiring priv-
ity have disapproved it on principle. 4 This disapproval stems partly from
a consideration of the common law backgrounds of the law of warranty be-
fore the notion of privity was introduced. Partly, it comes from a broader
view of the social policies to be served. Notions of privity and contract that
are involved in the law of warranty are largely derived from a time when
the distinctions between the manufacturer, retailer, and consumer were
fairly uncomplicated. The interested parties dealt face to face. But with
the advent of the modern methods of marketing and channels of distribu-
3 1 Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 90 Cal.2d 217, 237, 324 P.2d 583, 595 (1958) (concurring and
dissenting opinion).3 2 W=rSTON, SALES § 195 (rev. ed. 1948); Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. Rzv.
1 (1888).
83 Stuart v. Wilkins, 99 Eng.Rep. 15 (1778).
34 See, e.g., WHIuSTON, SALES § 244 (rev. ed. 1948); VoLD, SALEs § 152 (1931); PROSSE2,
TORTS 511 (2d ed. 1955).
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tion, reliance is more and more on the product or its brand name and less
on the person doing the actual selling. Therefore, the idea of privity of con-
tract becomes farther and farther removed from what is actually the under-
standing of the parties involved.35
Recent Trends
Recent attempts to extend the exceptions so far recognized in California
have met with only a limited success. In Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co.,30
where the defendant was a manufacturer of insecticides and the plaintiff the
ultimate buyer, the California Supreme Court held that it was error to in-
struct the jury that an implied warranty ran with the goods. The exceptions
of the Klein case and Free v. Sluss were cited as the only ones. The general
rule was still applicable to other types of goods where there was an im-
plied warranty. It might be noted that the action here was for damages to
the crops of the plantiff, hence the case could be restricted on its facts to
cases where there was property damage and not necessarily applied to per-
sonal injury situations3 7 The rule of the food cases was slightly broadened,
however, in another recent case8 in a Federal District Court applying
California law where food for consumption by animals was held to be in-
cluded within the exception of the Klein case and the warranty action was
allowed despite a lack of privity. Likewise, the exception made in Free v.
Sluss for the express warranty of the manufacturer which induced the reli-
ance of the plaintiff was restricted specifically to cases of manufacturing in
its literal sense. Cutting logs for lumber was held to be outside the scope
of the exception and the general rules of privity applied.35
Conclusion
It is submitted that these cases represent an unfortunate trend in the
law insofar as they grant or deny recovery on the warranty depending on
the existence of privity. The rule of itself should not be an obstacle in the
path of the courts if it is felt that the remedy on a warranty should be avail-
able in some particular case. The history of warranty itself reveals one ap-
proach in a return to the original common law essence of the action-a tort
imposing a strict liability on the seller of defective goods. Another approach
is by analogy to the development of the law of negligence relating to the
"dangerous instrumentality" rule and culminating in the abolition of priv-
ity by the courts. Once having accepted the exception to the rule in the case
35 Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 Im
L. Rzv. 400 (1930).
86 42 Cal.2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954). See note 29 supra.
37 This argument is strengthened by the fact that Justice Traynor joined in the opinion
although he has been a strong advocate of abolishing the rule requiring privity in cases where
personal injury was involved. See: Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 461, 150
P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring opinion).
88 McAfee v. Cargill, 121 F.Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
89 Collins v. Pope & Talbot Inc., 135 Cal. App. 2d 653, 288 P.d 75 (1955) ; See also: Odell
v. Frueh, 146 Cal. App. 2d 504, 304 P.2d 45 (1956).
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of foodstuffs as a matter of policy, there seems to be little grounds for re-
stricting it as applied to cases of other kinds. Certainly there is no justifi-
cation for the distinction to be found in the Sales Act itself, from whence
the exception is nominally derived. It is hard to believe that there is a poli-
cy favoring a man's stomach to the exclusion of the rest of his body. All
parts comprise the person and all are susceptible to injury. It would seem
more realistic to examine the rule from the standpoint of the applicable
policy reasons surrounding it, instead of compounding more case law au-
thority for the sake of a rule which is a historical anomaly.
The question should not be a question of who has contracted with whom
but rather which party is better able to bear the burden of risk arising from
the normal and proper use of a product placed on the market by a manu-
facturer. As a practical matter, it appears that the manufacturer is the one
better able to shoulder this difficult burden. It is the manufacturer who is
best able to guard against defects and may take precautions of care and in-
surance against them. The cost of this burden in turn may be effectively
distributed only by the producer or manufacturer as a part of the cost of
the product and thereby eventually placed on the consuming public. This
problem was well stated recently:40
The liability of the manufacturer should not turn on whether he has
"contracted" to assume it under such erratic tests that haphazardly afford
recovery to some and deny it to others. "[P] ublic policy demands that
responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards
of life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market."
40 Traynor, J., in Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal. 2d 217, 236, 324 P.2d 583, 589 (1958)
(concurring and dissenting opinion).
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